




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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: A VISION  
AND ITS DIMENSIONS

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Larry L. Miller  
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 1992



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92-12133



# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION US ARMY WAR COLLEGE		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) ROOT HALL, BUILDING 122 CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) The New World Order: A Vision and its Dimensions					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC Larry L. Miller					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 2 April 1992	
15. PAGE COUNT 41					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union has been dissolved. The United States is no longer the world's pre-eminent economic power. Both Europe and Japan are enjoying a greater share of the world's resources. Still, from the perspective of combined military, economic, political, and diplomatic power, the United States has no equal. President Bush suggests that a "New World Order" has emerged. Principles of democracy, shared responsibility and mutual cooperation among nations are the hallmarks of that new order. He recommends that the principles of the New World Order guide the foreign policy of the United States throughout the decade of the nineties and into the twenty-first century. This paper probes the dimensions of that New World Order. It discusses the likelihood of a unipolar or multipolar world, and concludes that a stratified world order might be a more apt description. It explores the role of international organizations within the new order. It examines implications for U.S. foreign policy, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army. The paper concludes by revealing why President Bush's vision is compelling.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL <i>Dr. Michael A. Fisher</i>			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717-245-3207		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL FWC-AB

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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THE NEW WORLD ORDER: A VISION  
AND ITS DIMENSIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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## ABSTRACT

**AUTHOR:** Larry L. Miller, LTC, USA

**TITLE:** The New World Order: A Vision And Its Dimensions

**FORMAT:** Individual Study Project

**DATE:** 2 April 1992    **PAGES:** 41    **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union has been dissolved. The United States is no longer the world's pre-eminent economic power. Both Europe and Japan are enjoying a greater share of the world's resources. Still, from the perspective of combined military, economic, political, and diplomatic power, the United States has no equal. President Bush suggests that a "New World Order" has emerged. Principles of democracy, shared responsibility and mutual cooperation among nations are the hallmarks of that new order. He recommends that the principles of the New World Order guide the foreign policy of the United States throughout the decade of the nineties and into the twenty-first century. This paper probes the dimensions of that New World Order. It discusses the likelihood of a unipolar or multipolar world, and concludes that a stratified world order might be a more apt description. It explores the role of international organizations within the new order. It examines implications for U.S. foreign policy, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army. The paper concludes by revealing why President Bush's vision is compelling.

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## INTRODUCTION.

The Cold War is over. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated; the Soviet people have rejected communism, and the Red Army no longer threatens the world as it once did. After more than four decades during which America's energies were focused on containing the threat to the free world from the forces of communism, those forces no longer exist. On Christmas Eve 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev went on television and announced to the Soviet people and to the world that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was dissolved. The following day, the flag of the Soviet Union was lowered for a final time and replaced by the flags of eleven independent countries, recently joined into a loose commonwealth.

At the same time, the relationship between the United States and its Western allies has also changed. The European Community and Japan are much more self-reliant economic powers. They rival the U.S. in wealth, quality of life, and industrial productivity. Because the United States is no longer the pre-eminent economic power on earth, "burden-sharing" has taken on a new meaning. The Japanese and the Germans, for example, paid for a large portion of the war in the Gulf to free Kuwait.

Still, there are those who submit that the U.S. remains a superpower, perhaps the world's only superpower.<sup>1</sup> From the perspective of combined military, economic, political, and diplomatic power, the United States has no equal. Some countries can rival the U.S. economically and perhaps some can rival it

across all the elements of power listed above. What then do these changes in the world situation mean for international relations? How should they affect U.S. national strategy?

President Bush suggests that a "New World Order" has emerged. Principles of democracy, shared responsibility and mutual cooperation are the hallmarks of that new order.<sup>2</sup> He recommends that the principles of the New World Order guide United States foreign policy throughout the decade of the nineties, into the twenty-first century. But what exactly is the New World Order? How will it affect U.S. foreign policy and national strategy? What are the implications for the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army? In this paper, I will analyze these questions. Part I will discuss President Bush's vision. It will document the dimensions and the historical development of the New World Order. Part II will analyze the post-Cold War world. It will question whether the United States is the only remaining superpower. It will discuss the likelihood of a unipolar or multipolar world. It will also explore other possibilities and project the role of international organizations within the new order. Part III will examine implications for U.S. foreign policy, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Army. The paper will conclude by revealing why President Bush's vision is compelling.

#### **PART I: NEW WORLD ORDER: THE VISION.**

On 11 September 1990, President Bush outlined to Congress a

vision for the future, calling it the New World Order. He described it as an era "freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world ... can prosper and live in harmony."<sup>3</sup> He went on to say that this is "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."<sup>4</sup> Addressing the United Nations in October 1990, he called for a new partnership of nations in order to promote mutual security and well-being. He said that the world needed "serious international cooperative efforts to make headway on threats to the environment, on terrorism, on managing the debt burden, on fighting the scourge of international drug trafficking and on refugees and peacekeeping around the world."<sup>5</sup>

These two speeches summarize President Bush's vision and provide the basis of his national strategy. Perhaps it is best stated in the last four objectives found in his 1991 National Security Strategy document:

A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.<sup>6</sup>

His "ways" for attaining these goals ("ends") are:

- to maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;
- to promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;



- to promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;
- to aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and
- to support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.<sup>7</sup>

Clearly, the President seeks the establishment of a stable and democratic world.<sup>8</sup> His primary "means" for attaining that goal are international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization. Although he does not discount the possibility of unilateral action when necessary, the preferred course of action will be through alliances and coalitions. World events will be shaped more by nations working in concert than through direct confrontation. Issues such as arms control, nuclear proliferation, illegal drugs, displaced persons, global economic imbalances, and environmental pollution will be addressed cooperatively.

President Bush does not dispute the leadership role the United States must assume in this New World Order; he disavows, however, our sole responsibility to make it happen. Isolation is not an option for George Bush. He disagrees vehemently with the "America First" philosophy of critics such as Patrick J. Buchanan, if that philosophy means retreating from our world-wide leadership role. Whereas Buchanan would narrowly define U.S. interests abroad, Bush believes that American interests are much more wide-ranging and encompassing.<sup>9</sup> The President believes that America cannot

afford, either economically or morally, to return to the isolationist days of 1920s and 1930s.

But what exactly are the interests of the United States in this "new world?" President Bush outlined most of them in the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States document mentioned above. There are other interests, however. And even though individual Americans often disagree about many things, they usually agree in matters of primary interest. Thus, the major national interests of the United States usually remain fairly constant. Such interests include open markets for trade, access to oil and other natural resources vital to our industrial base, the freedom of the high seas, the promotion of basic human rights and democratic principles, and non-aggression against ourselves and our allies. President Bush insists that these interests are transnational and preclude any possible return to isolationism.

From an economic perspective, even though our major trading partners are in Europe and the Far East, the United States has important interests around the globe. We are vitally interested in oil from the Middle East; we need natural resources from Africa and Indonesia; and we have significant export markets in Central and South America. Many of our larger companies are multinational in scope and are severely impacted by events in all corners of the world. The world-wide banking system, our status as a debtor nation, and the fact that our economy is substantially intertwined with the economies of several other major industrial nations, all point to the necessity for the United States to remain a world

power.

From a political perspective, no matter how much we would like to return to our shores and live the good life all by ourselves, the very demographic make-up of our population precludes that possibility. Our population includes refugees, immigrants, and ethnic groups from every region of the world; they are often vitally interested in the welfare of their former lands. Our Jewish population could never abandon Israel, our Greek population supports Greece, and Armenian-Americans obtained U.S. recognition for newly independent Armenia. In addition, the very fact that we have a treasured history of caring about basic human rights and the spread of democratic principles justifies our global concerns.

From a diplomatic perspective, we have many treaty commitments. We belong to the United Nations and other international organizations which represent important interests to the United States, such as world health problems, the ecology, the environment, refugees, food shortages, and population control. We belong to NATO; we have defense treaties with nations such as Panama, Japan, and Korea; and we have a special "understanding" with Israel.

From an environmental perspective, national borders mean nothing. The degradation of the atmosphere and the ozone layer observe no political or national boundaries. The condition of the oceans and the rain forests in Brazil affect all nations to some extent. The depletion of scarce natural resources and the possible effects of a nuclear disaster require the cooperation of everyone

on all five continents.

Likewise, from a military perspective, the U.S. can no longer afford to be the "policeman of the world." Without a doubt, however, active, well-trained, and well equipped armed forces are still necessary. Although the Soviet threat has been reduced substantially, it has not entirely subsided. Russia and the other newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union still maintain the largest military structure in the world. Their defense research and development effort remains largely intact and on a par with our own. Their strategic nuclear forces could easily destroy much of the North American continent and the American way of life. And even though the possibility of a global thermonuclear war or full-scale conventional war with the former Soviet Union has diminished, the possibility still exists. If nothing else, the recent changes in the Soviet Union should portend how quickly things can change and how vitally important it is to be prepared for multiple contingencies in that part of the world.

In addition, the possibility of other kinds of wars has actually increased. With the end of the bipolar world, where the world was divided up into two opposing camps, the resurgence of past regional and ethnic rivalries has already begun to resurface. The civil wars in Yugoslavia and the republic of Georgia offer current examples. Who knows where these struggles may lead, or what requirements they might place on the need for future American intervention? The Middle East also remains volatile. Iran, Syria, Egypt, and even Iraq continue to maintain very large military

forces. And in other parts of the world, China, North Korea, India, Vietnam and a number of other countries could pose the possibility of a significant regional challenge in a military conflict with the United States.

The increased availability of advanced technologies and weapons systems to developing nations and terrorist organizations also poses a serious threat to the United States and its interests. Some of the most sophisticated weapons in the world are openly bought and sold on the world market. Too many of these weapons in the hands of the wrong people could easily de-stabilize the Middle East or parts of Asia, where money is readily available and old feuds could easily resurface.

But the question remains, how do these foreign armies and abundant armaments threaten the security interests of the United States? Why are we, as a nation, concerned about modern weapons falling into the hands of the wrong people? After all, none of the nations mentioned above, with the possible exception of the former Soviet Union, could possibly project significant power against the North American continent. The United States could easily stay out of almost any regional conflict simply by walking away.

That assessment is probably true, but it does not offer an acceptable option. Conflicts remain. How then can we really be confident that these clashes will never spill over onto our shores? We assumed that we could stay out of such conflicts before World War II and lost half our Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. President Bush does not want to invite a similar disaster in the future. He

sees new possibilities, based upon a shared commitment among nations. And he sees the model for the future in the Gulf War:

This order, this ability to work together got its first real test in the Gulf War. For the first time, a regional conflict, the aggression against Kuwait, did not serve as a proxy for superpower confrontation. For the first time, the United Nations Security Council, free from the clash of Cold War ideologies, functioned as its designers intended, a force for conflict resolution and collective security.

In the Gulf, nations from Europe and North America, Asia and Africa and the Arab world joined together to stop aggression, and sent a signal to would-be tyrants everywhere in the world. By joining forces to defend one small nation, we showed that we can work together against aggressors in defense of principle.<sup>10</sup>

Thus President Bush indicates how the world should "police" itself. All peace-loving nations should join together to promote their own well-being and to deny or redress unlawful international acts. The President led the world in building a successful military coalition in the Gulf; now he proposes similar arrangements for the future. In doing that, he seeks to ensure that the burden of securing the peace will not be unfairly borne by the U.S. or any other country. No nation will be taxed beyond its means, because all nations will share world-wide security responsibilities in appropriate measure.

The President is not so naive, however, so as to think that simply because the world needs to cooperate, that it will cooperate. He recognizes the need for U.S. leadership and power to sometimes force a particular perspective. Whereas some Americans

would argue that Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a one-time lucky break in coalition-building, President Bush thinks it to be repeatable in the future.<sup>11</sup>

According to the President, "the New World Order is not a fact; it is an aspiration -- and an opportunity."<sup>12</sup> Although he is not a "Wilsonian," the President would probably agree that it is similar to the opportunity that the world had after World War I when President Wilson and others conceived the idea for the League of Nations. It is an aspiration contained in the United Nations charter that was ratified by most of the world's nations after World War II. But, as Bush has said, "twice this century, a dream born on the battlefields of Europe died after the shooting stopped. [It was] the dream of a world in which major powers would work together to ensure peace; to settle their disputes through cooperation, not confrontation."<sup>13</sup> Such is President Bush's personal assessment. Such is his vision. He challenges us all not to fail a third time this century, or the next.

## **PART II: PRESENT WORLD ORDER: AN ANALYSIS**

### **UNIPOLAR OR MULTIPOLAR?**

Although some statesmen and strategic thinkers around the globe disagree with President Bush's vision, all agree that the world has entered a new era. The old bipolar world which pitted capitalism against communism, the East against the West, and the United States against the Soviet Union has all but disappeared.

Mikhail Gorbachev could not have made the point better than he did in his farewell address as President of the U.S.S.R.:

We live in a new world. The Cold War has ended; the arms race has stopped, as has the insane militarization that mutilated our economy, public psyche and morals. The threat of a world war has been removed...

We opened ourselves to the world, gave up interference into other people's affairs, the use of troops beyond the borders of the country, and trust, solidarity and respect came in response. We have become one of the main foundations for the transformation of modern civilization on peaceful and democratic grounds.<sup>14</sup>

Although all analysts agree that a radical change is taking place, there are many different perspectives about that change. Generally, however, two main schools of thought seem to be emerging. One stresses the dominant position and enormous resources of the United States; the other stresses the interdependent nature and resource constraints of the world as a whole.

Analysts who belong to the first school maintain that our world is now unipolar. Charles Krauthammer asserts that "The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies."<sup>15</sup> Those who hold this view concentrate on the military might of the United States. They are quick to point out that the U.S. is the only nation with the ability to project military power around the globe. In addition, they also assert that the U.S. has sufficient economic, diplomatic, and political power to enforce its wishes. All other



nations pale in comparison.<sup>16</sup> As James Kurth has pointed out:

The hesitant and reluctant behavior of Germany and Japan during the Gulf War caused many to conclude that these countries are incapable of taking initiative and exercising power in international affairs. And in fact the two are presently incapable of employing military power, or exercising any serious political influence on a global scale (or even within the Middle East). The only global power for some time to come will be the United States, and the only world order will be an American one.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, analysts like Jay Winik and John Sewell dispute this unipolar perspective.<sup>18</sup> Rather, they see a multipolar world. They point out that economic power is now more important than military power. They cite at least three concentrations of that power around the world: the European Community, Japan and East Asia, and the United States and Canada. All three concentrations compete more or less equally for economic dominance. As John Sewell points out, "[Although] the U.S. economy is still the world's largest and wealthiest, the rise of other powers and U.S. economic mismanagement ... have eroded the ability of the United States to pursue its interests unilaterally."<sup>19</sup>

Without deliberating whether the world is presently unipolar or multipolar, other analysts are quick to point out that in the twenty-first century no nation will long remain the only dominant power on earth. As Ted Carpenter argues, "The concept of a unipolar moment is little more than a mirage that will soon vanish."<sup>20</sup> History shows that lesser powers soon team up to counterbalance the current dominant power. Although few analysts dispute the

perspective that the U.S. is today the preeminent power on earth. many question how long that preeminence will last. Even Krauthammer states that "if America succeeds in running its economy into the ground, it will not be able to retain its unipolar role for long...(one decade, perhaps, rather than, say, three or four)."<sup>21</sup> Others point out that global concerns -- such as the ecology, the environment, AIDS, drugs, weapons proliferation, and problems of access to energy -- portend increased international interaction in order to solve these communal concerns.

In addition, the global economy, multinational corporations and more equitably distributed centers of economic power are also pushing the world toward the absolute requirement of consensus building among nations.<sup>22</sup> As Joseph Nye asserts in Bound To Lead:

Large governments are losing their ability to control private actors that work easily across national borders. The recovery of governmental power, while never complete, can be enhanced by coordinated action among governments. To develop such coordination, the United States will have to invest more heavily in a variety of multilateral institutions than it has in the past decade.<sup>23</sup>

President Bush has postured himself to take advantage of both phases of this new world. Observing his ultimate aim of promoting democracy, mutual cooperation and stability, he is resisting the temptation to act alone in world crises. Rather, he is building consensus among nations now, even though the U.S. may well have the capability to act unilaterally. Thus he hopes to show the world the road to a new and better way of interacting and solving world problems.

## STRATIFIED WORLD ORDER.

Because our world is both multipolar and unipolar -- depending upon the element (or elements) of power from which one is looking at a particular situation -- perhaps Michael Roskin and Nicholas Berry have hit upon a better way of describing our present world. They propose a "stratified" model:

A stratified world would have at least three levels: a superpower at the top, major players one level down, and a series of weaker countries ranging from robust NICs (newly industrialized countries) to pathetic basket cases. The second tier could be further divided into two: the "money-bag powers of Germany and Japan, and countries such as Britain and France who have moderate ability to project power overseas."<sup>24</sup>

This description of a stratified world looks very much like our world today. As Krauthammer has said:

There is today no lack of second-rank powers. Germany and Japan are economic dynamos. Britain and France can deploy diplomatic and to some extent military assets. The Soviet Union possesses several elements of power -- military, diplomatic and political -- but all are in rapid decline. There is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it.

Only a few months ago it was conventional wisdom that the new rivals, the great pillars of the new multipolar world, would be Japan and Germany (and/or Europe). How quickly a myth can explode. The notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence is a materialist illusion. Economic power is a necessary condition for great power status. But it certainly is not sufficient, as has been made clear by the recent behavior of Germany and Japan, which have generally hidden under the table since the first shots rang out in Kuwait. And while a unified Europe may sometime in the next century act as a single power, its initial disarray and disjointed

national responses to the crisis in the Persian Gulf again illustrate that "Europe" does not yet qualify even as a player on the world stage.

Which leaves us with the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world, brought sharply into focus by the gulf crisis: a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrialized West.<sup>25</sup>

It is important to understand this present world order, or else the United States will misperceive its proper role within it. Again, as Krauthammer says: "Roles ... are not invented in the abstract; they are a response to a perceived world structure."<sup>26</sup> Or, as Roskin and Berry point out:

If we misunderstand the nature of the system in which we operate, we can make terrible, expensive mistakes. For example, if we try to continue operating under the rules of the bipolar system of the Cold War, we will become frustrated and perplexed that our allies no longer follow our lead, that we are slipping behind economically, and that we have no more worthwhile enemies. It would be like trying to play a game whose rules have changed. If we try to operate on the basis that the world system is now strictly a multipolar economic race, we might neglect our military strength and be caught short when an aggressor goes on the warpath. Understanding the world system, then, means you can go with the flow of events (and sometimes manipulate them) instead of working against them.<sup>27</sup>

Granting a stratified model of our present world order, what then ought the U.S. response be to its pre-eminent leadership role? President Bush disagrees vehemently with the perspective which Krauthammer attributes to Jeane J. Kirkpatrick shortly before the Gulf crisis:

"It is time to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status," time to give up the "unusual burdens" of the past and "return to 'normal' times." That means taking "care of pressing problems of education, family, industry and technology" at home. That means that we should not try to be the balancer of power in Europe or in Asia, nor try to shape the political evolution of the Soviet Union. We should aspire instead to be "a normal country in a normal time."<sup>28</sup>

Rather, the President insists that American leadership is needed now more than ever.<sup>29</sup> He agrees that the U.S. must get its fiscal house in order and that it must re-vitalize its industry, family structure, and educational system. But, at the same time, he insists that we cannot abandon our present role as world leader.<sup>30</sup>

With minor modifications, The President would probably agree with Krauthammer's summation:

We are in for abnormal times. Our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will--the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of the world order and being prepared to enforce them. Compared to the task of defeating fascism and communism, averting chaos [which would happen without U.S. leadership] is a rather subtle call to greatness. It is not a task we are any more eager to undertake than the great twilight struggle just concluded. But it is just as noble and just as necessary.<sup>31</sup>

If Krauthammer changed that assessment to recognize a "stratified" world order and the important role of international organizations within that order, President Bush would surely applaud his analysis and his call to greatness. For the President's vision incorporates nations other than the United States, and

projects a role for all peace-loving nations working in harmony for the common good.<sup>32</sup> That is one of the reasons why he has recently increased U.S. participation in the United Nations. The result of that involvement and the changes in the world order have given it new vitality.

#### NEW LIFE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS.

During the 1980's, the people of the United States decided that American leadership had to become more assertive. They voted Jimmy Carter out of office in favor of Ronald Reagan and George Bush. Some Americans concluded that U.S. global leadership required acting unilaterally, but they could not have been more wrong. According to The Economist:

unilateralism was not the way America did business with its allies in its most powerful days in the 1950's. That was when the United States was most involved in multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.

As a great power with important interests all over the world, the United States must constantly help to develop and support international regimes which set the rules and develop the institutions that govern areas of interdependence. Many of these international institutions aid American policy and make the world a safer place to live. Nuclear weapons, for example have been curtailed because of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the UN International Atomic Energy Agency. And without an organization like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade protectionism might well have gotten out of control.

International organizations have the potential to help governments in four important ways: first, they promote "burden sharing" among nations, so that all nations act more responsibly than they might have if they had no financial stake in the outcome. Second, they provide common information to governments. This information fosters more effective action in combating communicable diseases, in allocating telecommunications frequencies, and in limiting pollution of the atmosphere and oceans. Third, they facilitate diplomacy. Finally, in democratic countries like the United States, they foster greater discipline within U.S. foreign policy.<sup>33</sup>

International rules help reinforce continuity and a long-term focus, in contrast to what typically prevails in democratic politics. They also set limits on constituency pressures in Congress. For example, when domestic vintners sought to exclude European wines, U.S. wheat farmers, worried about retaliation, were able to defeat the move in part by invoking rules of GATT.<sup>34</sup>

President Bush recognizes the importance of these organizations and is actively attempting to use them as forums to achieve his "ends": democracy, shared responsibility and mutual cooperation among nations. Obviously, the United Nations is the most important of these organizations, so President Bush is greatly increasing U.S. involvement in it. But he is seeking the influence of other international bodies as well.

Although there are more than 200 contemporary transnational bodies, the U.N. system has the broadest scope. Beyond its General Assembly and the Security Council, the U.N. also consists of

subgroups, such as the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, the U.N. Children's Fund, the U.N. Conference on Environmental Concerns, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, and many more. These specialty groups address everything from terrorism to disaster relief.

The General Assembly and the Security Council remain the primary focus of the U.N., however. When they were formed in 1945 as the natural successor to the League of Nations, many people in the United States hoped that the United Nations would embody a vision of universal democracy and collective responsibility. The Cold War, however, dispelled that dream. The Soviet Union distrusted the West, particularly the United States, and thus failed to cooperate in most matters of the U.N., except those of overriding mutual concern to the East and West, such as the Suez Canal issue in the 1950s.

Although "in some important ways the relationships among the great powers have remained stable"<sup>35</sup> since the beginning of the U.N., certain trends in U.N. activities are evident. From 1945 to 1966, for example, when the U.S. dominated the U.N., the Soviets used the power of the veto to counter any proposal regarded as detrimental to international communism. Following the entry of the former colonial countries into the General Assembly in the 1960's, however, all that changed. Their support enabled the Soviet Union to dominate the General Assembly. By 1970, in order to protect Israel and other national interests, the U.S. had embarked on a course remarkably similar to that used by the Soviet Union in



previous years; now, the U.S. freely employed the power of the veto. U.S. involvement in the U.N. declined even further during the Reagan years. In fact, U.S. activity in the U.N. did not pick up again until the Gulf War.<sup>36</sup>

By the end of the 1980s, the U.N. began to assume new importance. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of its revival has been its role since the mid 1980s in managing regional conflicts, such as those in Cyprus, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Cambodia. In large part, Michael Gorbachev made this possible when, in 1987, he decided to pay the USSR's dues to the U.N. Then, remarkably, he began to defer to it in certain matters that previously the Soviet block would have stonewalled.<sup>37</sup>

All these developments point to the possibility that a new era may indeed be upon us. With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations may yet attain the dream that many had for it back in 1945. Regional conflicts among countries that must rely on strictly limited resources tend to check themselves, especially when outside countries don't replenish their treasuries or economies. The U.S. and the USSR are increasingly reluctant to continue costly commitments to client states. Thus the U.N. has more of a chance to moderate when the belligerents turn to it. This means that the U.N.'s role in settling regional conflicts will increase during the next decade. Multinational peacekeeping forces and monitoring missions will be used more freely. The U.N. may yet become that instrument of international cooperation to which the nations of the world will routinely defer as a better way of working out their

differences.<sup>38</sup>

President Bush is not limited only to the United Nations for implementation of his vision. He can use many other international organizations as "ways" of pursuing his "ends". Among them are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Overseas Development Council--all of which may support economic development and alleviate debt burden. Organizations like Amnesty International and Greenpeace are available to address human rights and environmental issues. The World Health Organization and the World Food Program also offer other possibilities for international cooperation. All of these international bodies can help the President in promoting the cooperative efforts he outlined in his speech before the United Nations in October 1990: cleaning up the environment, combating terrorism, reducing drug trafficking, and managing debt.<sup>39</sup>

It is, therefore, a moot question whether or not the world is presently unipolar or multipolar. It is both; it is stratified. Even a great power like the United States cannot unilaterally solve all the world's problems solely by itself. Just as our planet is, at one and the same time, both one and diverse; just as the "Family of Man" is, at one and the same time, both common and unique; so is the world in which we live both unipolar and multipolar. From a diplomatic perspective, for example, modern communications have made it impossible for one nation to quietly "bully" other nations for very long without public opinion around the world being brought to bear against it. From an economic perspective, there are at

least three, more or less, equal trading blocs: the United States, the Japanese, and the European Community. From a military perspective, the United States has no equal in conventional war capability. But the former Soviet Union can still match it one for one in nuclear arms. And in specific regional conflicts, certain regional powers (e.g., Vietnam) could prevail in the face of inadequate popular support in the United States.

Yet given the combined diplomatic, economic, political, and military might of the United States, it is the world's single superpower; and it now has a unique opportunity to lead the other nations of the world, according to the "stratified" model. Through international organizations, it will have to defer to the major concerns of the world community, but that could end up prolonging its superpower status. If it leads, and the other nations follow, many of the world's problems can be addressed and maybe solved without bankrupting the U.S. treasury. The shared resources of the world and shared responsibility among nations--along with U.S. leadership--could make the "New World" the hope of future generations.

### **PART III: IMPLICATIONS.**

President Bush's New World Order is visionary. It comes at just the right time in history. It offers an opportunity that the nations of the world cannot afford to ignore. It allows the U.S. to assume its greatest, most constructive, global leadership ever. The

President's goal, however, is quite simple: a stable and democratic world, marked by international cooperation and shared responsibility. Because the major problems of the New World cut across national boundaries and the solutions to global problems exceed the resources of any single nation, the international organizations mentioned in Part II can provide the "ways" and "means" for solving these problems. Let's now consider implications of the President's vision for U.S. foreign policy, the Department of Defense, and the Army.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

The ramifications of the New World Order are profound, both for the U.S. and for the rest of the world. Three times in this century we have endured major wars.<sup>40</sup> Two of those wars were "hot;" one was "cold." After each, the world hoped for peace and stability through mutual cooperation and a widespread acceptance of the principles of democracy. After World War I, the League of Nations was formed--but soon abandoned. Likewise, after World War II, the United Nations was established--but it too floundered because of the Cold War. The nuclear age then brought the world to the brink of destruction. Now, however, the Cold War is over. The world has yet another chance. Is it possible that the nations of the world are now ready to cooperate on a new level of shared responsibility? Have recurrent issues of the past and present pressures finally convinced the world that it must find a new way to solve its problems?

These problems far exceed the capability of one nation working alone to solve them. Ecological and environmental problems threaten the earth's ozone layer, its rain forests, its air, its rivers and even its oceans. World poverty and food shortages affect the lives of more than a billion people daily. AIDS has become a worldwide epidemic.

In addition, modern communications, like Cable News Network, are bringing the world closer together than ever before. Multinational corporations cut across national boundaries almost at will. And the economies of the world's richest nations are inextricably dependent upon each other. All of these modern developments cry out for international cooperation and shared responsibility.

But what about national sovereignty? No nation wants to subjugate its rights and responsibilities to an outside body. Why, for example, should the U.S. worry about the rest of the world when its own domestic problems are so great? Why get involved in the problems of others if it is not necessary? Perhaps no one could have stated the case for isolation better than did John Quincy Adams nearly two centuries ago when he said that America "is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."<sup>41</sup> Who could dispute that this distinction between what we owe to others and what we owe to ourselves should still guide U.S. foreign policy? It seems almost obvious that unless American interests are at stake, especially her vital interests, America should maintain her sovereignty and stay

out of foreign entanglements.

But modern global issues belie traditional U.S. independence and isolationism. Many current world problems are vitally important to the U.S. and its people. So, too, they are equally important to the other nations of the world. As was mentioned before, economic problems, health problems, world hunger, the control of refugees, population growth and Third World development all affect the U.S. and the entire international community. And even though the U.S. is a superpower, it nonetheless does not have the capability or resources to solve these problems alone.<sup>42</sup>

The question of sovereignty thus seems outdated. Of course, nations should act in their own best interest. But that interest now extends inexorably beyond national boundaries. In the case of the U.S., for example, we are "now much more dependent on the outside world for investment capital and for export markets."<sup>43</sup> We now see a need for the cooperation of a number of developing countries to help solve environmental problems like global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer.<sup>44</sup> We understand that, from a military perspective, the high cost of technology, the need for forward bases, the containment of nuclear proliferation and the current practice of coalition warfare all point to the need for more cooperative efforts between nations.<sup>45</sup> International organizations like the U.N. provide the obvious vehicles for such cooperation.

But will the New World Order "play in Peoria"? Will the American people allow its government to pursue a foreign policy so

intertwined in the U.N. and other international organizations? The answers to those questions remain problematic. On the one hand, a cooperative world order is part of the American dream and has always been an element of American foreign policy.<sup>46</sup> We are a nation of hope, a nation that has always believed in itself and in its ability to solve problems, and a nation convinced of its inherent mission to spread democracy wherever possible. The end of the Cold War gives us one more chance to pursue that dream. On the other hand, as Zbigniew Brzezinski points out, that dream will soon fade away if the U.S. does not first get its domestic house in order.

Domestic problems could cause a reactive wave of isolationism to spread across America and leave the New World Order without a leader. And, as Brzezinski says, that would be tragic and catastrophic for the world.

Accordingly, U.S. policy will have to strike a more deliberate balance among global needs for continued American commitments, the desirability of some devolution of U.S. regional security responsibilities [to the European Community and Japan] and the imperatives of America's domestic renewal.... More emphasis will have to be placed on cooperation with genuine partners, including shared decision-making in world security issues.<sup>47</sup>

John Sewell agrees with Brzezinski and supports the perspective of mutual cooperation among nations:

In the future, [he says], U.S. policymakers who want to influence developments in other nations are going to have to rely far less on unilateral approaches, whether through military or development assistance. The

premium will be on seeking to influence other donors to support initiatives and programs that address our mutual interests.<sup>48</sup>

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE ARMY.

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet military power, analysts around the world are saying that there is no longer a need for large standing military forces. In the United States specifically, critics argue that we can no longer afford a worldwide military presence. From both Democrats and Republicans alike, there are calls for a reduced defense force.

These critical developments have caused new thinking within the Department of Defense. Soldiers and civilians alike are questioning old paradigms and seeking alternative patterns of behavior and organization. But now we need to ask: what kind of defense organization and Army does the United States now need to fight the limited wars of the twenty-first century? Many people say that, in the foreseeable future, there will be no more large-scale battles, such as we might have expected to fight in Europe or faced in the Second World War. They see much smaller engagements in the Third World, with very precise and limited objectives. They see the United States fighting in joint and combined operations where no single nation provides the only resources necessary to pursue the campaign. They say that limited wars fought by international coalitions are the hallmark of the future, since there are very few places in the world where American fighting forces might go that do not need international cooperation and host nation support.

With that in mind, certain characteristics of that defense



force readily surface: It must be forward based, rapidly deployable, and capable of entering into coalition warfare. It must be capable of operating in multiple theaters at the same time (e.g., Europe, the Middle East, the Americas, or Asia). In order to be taken seriously, it must be robust enough to project sufficient power against possible adversaries. Part of it must be forward deployed; and all of it must be lethal, trained, well-equipped, and expandable.<sup>49</sup>

General Powell's "base-case" structure meets all of these requirements. It emphasizes a strong Navy, for projecting power and maintaining the freedom of the high seas. It emphasizes a modern, capable, and lethal Air Force, which can quickly deploy to any part of the globe. And to a lesser extent, it emphasizes sufficient ground force necessary to promote and defend U.S. national interests.<sup>50</sup>

#### CONCLUSION.

Without a doubt, President Bush and his advisors have a vision. It expresses the hopes and desires of almost every American for a stable and peaceful world, one where the rule of law negates the need for armed conflict. That vision, however, may become only a vague dream of a "wished-for" reality. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the possibility of thermonuclear war and enhanced cooperation among the major nations of the world, it has also triggered the resurfacing of ethnic and regional rivalries. These

rivalries could, eventually, destabilize the world.

The great challenge for the international community is to determine how to come together to solve common problems. No nation on earth, not even the very powerful United States, can do it alone. For the New World Order to fully develop as President Bush envisions it, all the major nations of the earth will have to in some way join together for the good of all. The world's only remaining superpower can only lead in that direction; it can neither sustain the momentum nor guarantee the outcome. As Brzezinski says: "Though America is today admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are too complex and America's domestic health too precarious to sustain a worldwide Pax Americana."<sup>51</sup> The entire international community must accept a shared responsibility for worldwide peace and stability.

The quintessential question for all the major nations of the world is: What ought to be the nature of their participation in the world arena? With the end of the East/West confrontation, will cooperation in international affairs go the way of the dinosaur? Will nations seek only their own good and, once again, develop power blocks that will eventually cause a major worldwide armed conflict?

George Bush says that the nations of the world cannot allow such a catastrophe to happen. Nor does he believe that it will happen, and he wants others to believe the same thing. In that way, he seeks to help nudge the world in the direction of a new era. Believing that we are on the verge of a new age of peace and

stability will improve its chances of becoming reality. But George Bush is not a utopian, "if 'utopia' is understood in an absolute sense as a 'good but unachievable society....'"<sup>52</sup> Yet, then again, neither is he a realist, if that implies only the possibility of "power" checking or subduing other "power." More probably, Bush is what Ken Booth would call a "utopian realist" -- one whose approach to politics Stanley Hoffmann would call "uplifting."<sup>53</sup>

George Bush would agree with Oscar Wilde, who once wrote that "A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at."<sup>54</sup> He is a man of hope who wants others to know the same. He is a world leader who believes that nations are not just the objects of historical forces, but can also be the subjects who forge a path to a better quality of living for all the world's citizens. But for him, utopia is not an end-point. Rather, it is a perspective of living. It is what Ken Booth calls a "process utopia."

Process utopias ... are benign and reformist steps calculated to make a better world somewhat more probable for future generations. Trying to reduce the risk of war each year, improving human rights and spreading economic justice are examples of such policies. Generalized images of a preferred future world can be offered, but the details can only be settled when the future problems and prospects are clearer. Process utopianism is thus practical utopianism. It is not a "revolutionary" agenda in which the end justifies the means, but rather an approach to politics in which in a real sense the means are the ends. So, if we look after the processes, the structures should look after themselves; and as Camus said in the early 1950's, the means one uses today shape the ends one might perhaps reach tomorrow.<sup>55</sup>

The New World Order, then, is not an end-state, reflecting a world where peace and mutual cooperation among nations are already-achieved goals. It is, instead, a heading in international relations to which all peace-loving nations aspire. Made possible because the Cold War is finally over, the vision of the New World Order reflects the dreams of the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations. It stresses democratic principles, hope for a brighter tomorrow, and the interdependent nature of the family of humankind.

The concept of the New World Order mirrors human interaction in its finest form, not as an already realized fact, but as an aspiration to be achieved one day at a time by people--and their nations--who respect each other and who are willing to work for the common good.

Through pictures from outerspace, the people of the world have been able to see the earth in a new light. These pictures do not reflect our differences; rather, they emphasize our commonality. They show the earth to be one tiny planet in a vast universe, not primarily separate and distinct nations. If George Bush is able to infuse others with his vision of shared responsibilities and mutual cooperation, the men and women of the future will have a chance to experience that "commonality" here on earth.

Bobby Kennedy once said: "Some men see things as they are and say why; I dream things that never were and say why not."<sup>56</sup> In that spirit, George Bush is asking all of us to take a fresh look at the world around us. It has changed dramatically, he says. It has

changed for the better, and the people of the world now have a chance to enter a new era of trust -- one that is marked by optimism and hope, reflecting the most basic core of the human spirit.

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